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Abstract 
In fully developing the so-called information society, the use of new technologies for 
commercial transaction by electronic means and without the traditional paper support is 
increasingly common. This gives rise to the advantages of higher speed and lower costs in 
carrying out business activities, as well as the possibility of expanding the potential offers 
market for business. Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TSL) protocol 
remain by far the most widely used means for providing security services for e-commerce 
transactions, despite the fact that these protocols were designed to provide security for 
communications links, and not for entire e-commerce transactions. Hence, does not support 
client authentication, which in turn makes certain frauds during online electronic transaction 
to take place. Though a large number of researches have been carried out in securing 
electronic transaction there is a lack of research been done in securing client authentication. 
This paper is to propose a different way of using the GSM Authentication to enhance the 
security of electronic transactions, which will also in return in increase the mobility when 
making an Internet transaction.  
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1. Introduction 
The Internet is inherently insecure for transactions as it can be compromised at 
several points, including the user’s computer, the merchant’s or service provider’s system or 
at any intermediate point between them on the network. 
 
This is because the Internet consists of many different computer networks that are all 
interconnected using a common protocol. Due to this open network architecture, messages 
traverse many different networks between source and destination. For example, when a user 
transmits a credit card number over the Internet to a merchant, this number passes through 
several computer systems, including systems of other network users before reaching the 
merchant’s computer. The integrity of the message could be compromised at any of the 
intermediate points. Furthermore, as business on the Internet grows, it will become more 
difficult for both the buyer and the merchant to know whether each is legitimate. Hence, this 
paper will propose a payment protocol, which will utilize the security services provided in the 
GSM air interface to support user authentication.  
 
Two very important technological trends in recent years have been the wide 
acceptance of mobile phones around the world and the growth of e-commerce. For example, 
mobile phone usage is forecast to reach almost 80% of the population in Europe by 2005 [1]. 
Key characteristics of the mobile phone include the fact that it is ubiquitous, personal, and 
that the average user is reasonably competent in using it. This fact suggests that it can be used 
for authentication and authorization in electronic payment transactions, since it already 
contains a physically secure cryptographic device (i.e., the Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM)). 
 
However, despite all the advantages that a mobile phone has as a means of electronic 
payment, there are also several drawbacks, including the following. 
 
a. Usability 
Mobile phones are small, have limited processing power, use low-bandwidth 
communication technologies, use batteries with limited life spans, and often have a relatively 
limited user interface.  
 
b. Theft 
A number of current mobile communication systems store all the subscriber-specific 
information needed to use a mobile phone inside a smart card (e.g., a GSM SIM). To protect 
the phone, the user can be required to enter a PIN, although it would appear that this security 
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measure is not widely used. However, even if a PIN is used, the smart card typically remains 
unlocked until the phone is switched off or the SIM loses power. From a security point of 
view the most important risk that arises is loss or theft of the phone and the embedded smart 
card. An attacker with a stolen SIM is potentially able to make fraudulent transactions at the 
owner's expense, at least until the SIM is reported stolen and blocked, assuming that the SIM 
is not PIN protected. Furthermore, if the SIM was stolen in an unlocked state, an attacker 
could gain access to any personal information in the SIM and Mobile Equipment (ME). Thus 
a payment scheme based on use of a GSM SIM to help secure the transaction may need to be 
combined with another authentication method, e.g. username and password, if the fraud threat 
arising from use of a stolen SIM is to be addressed. In such a case an attacker would need 
both the user SIM and password to impersonate the user to a seller.  
 
c. Radio interface threats 
Mobile communications between a mobile phone and a serving network appear to be 
more susceptible to eavesdropping and interference than current Internet traffic through fixed 
networks. This is because of the intrinsic greater vulnerability of radio networks to 
interception. Moreover, the quality of the communications channel can be highly variable 
when a mobile device is used in a built environment. Thus transmitted data should be 
protected in terms of authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. The protocol requires the 
buyer to have a public key pair. This key pair would typically be stored in the buyer PC, and 
hence the buyer has to use this particular machine every time a transaction is to be made. 
Although a smart card could be employed to store the key and enhance mobility, not many 
user PCs are equipped with smart card readers. 
 
However, the GSM-based scheme described in this paper does not require such a key 
pair to be generated, since its security relies on the secret keys stored in a GSM SIM. 
Moreover, basing security on a mobile phone also inherently supports a level of user mobility. 
 
In this paper the protocol we will propose will reduce the threat posed by the storage 
of un-encrypted card numbers in a merchant server by reducing the value of stolen card 
numbers to a fraudster. This is achieved by requiring the user to possess both a debit/credit 
card and a GSM Mobile Station (MS), i.e. a GSM Mobile Equipment (ME) and a GSM 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), which must be registered under the same name as appears 
on the card.  
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2. Mobile Infrastructure And Services 
The existence of a suitable transport infrastructure is important for enabling the use of 
mobile phones in electronic payments. In this section we describe the security services 
provided by the GSM and UMTS mobile communications systems. A brief description of the 
SMS and SIM Application Toolkit services is also given. 
 
a. GSM Security 
A GSM network can be divided into three functional entities [2]. These are the 
mobile station carried by the subscriber, consisting of a Mobile Equipment (ME) with its 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), the network subsystem which performs the switching of 
calls between the users and between mobile and fixed network users, and the Base Station 
subsystem, which controls the air interface between the mobile station and the network 
subsystem. The main security services provided by the GSM air interface are [3]:   
 
i. Subscriber identity confidentiality 
ii. Data confidentiality 
iii. Subscriber identity authentication.  
 
Hence we will go into detail of Subscribers identity authentication, as this is the issue we will 
solve it in this paper. 
 
i. Subscriber identity authentication. 
Within every SIM there exists a long-term secret key, Ki, which is unique and 
known only to the SIM and Authentication Centre (AuC) of the home network 
operator of the subscriber. The home network operator is the organization with whom 
the subscriber has a contractual arrangement for the provision of service, and which 
the subscriber pays for this service. 
 
To authenticate a SIM, the visited network needs a triplet which consists of a 
random number (RAND), the expected response (XRES), and a secret cipher key (Kc). 
The (RAND, XRES) pair enables the network to verify the authenticity of the SIM 
without having the key Ki, while Kc is used for encryption. To compute a triplet, the 
AuC generates a RAND and passes it with Ki as parameters to algorithms A3 and A8, 
which are specific to a network operator. The outputs of A3 and A8 are XRES and Kc 
respectively. 
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The AuC generates triplets as required, and passes them to whichever 
network needs them. When a SIM is requested to authenticate itself to a network, a 
RAND from a triplet provided by the SIM's home network is sent from the network to 
the SIM. Since the SIM is equipped with the function A3 and the secret key Ki, it can 
generate the Signed Response (SRES) using RAND and Ki as inputs. The SIM then 
sends the SRES to the network where the SRES is compared with the XRES. If they 
match, SIM verification is successful. 
 
Each mobile network operator maintains two databases: the Home Location 
Register (HLR), and the Visitor Location Register (VLR). The HLR is used to store 
information regarding the subscribers of this operator. The VLR holds information on 
subscribers, which have roamed into its network. GSM air interface security is based 
on a secret key shared by the subscriber's home network and the SIM. The secret keys 
of the subscribers of a network are stored in an Authentication Center (AC) 
maintained by that network, which generates security parameters on request by the 
HLR. The AC is usually implemented as part of the HLR [4].  
 
Each SIM has a unique international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) and a 
secret key Ki shared only with the subscriber's network operator AC. During 
authentication, two keyed functions (A3; A8), and a stream cipher 
encryption/decryption algorithm A5 are used. To authenticate a subscriber (holder of 
a SIM) to the network, the subscriber sends its IMSI to the VLR, which, in turn, 
sends a request to the subscriber's HLR. The HLR requests the AC to generate a 
triplet (R, SRES, Kc), where R is a random challenge, SRES (the expected response to 
the challenge) = A3Ki(R), and Kc (the session encryption key) = A8Ki(R). This triplet 
is then provided to the VLR, which sends R to the mobile device, and hence to the 
SIM, which recomputes SRES and Kc using its stored copy of Ki, and returns SRES. 
If the returned value agrees with the value in the triple, the mobile is deemed 
authentic, and data exchanged between the mobile and the network is subsequently 
encrypted using Kc. This encrypted channel is also used to transfer a temporary 
identity (TMSI) for the mobile to provide a measure of mobile anonymity (avoiding 
the need for the IMSI to be routinely sent across the wireless channel). 
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b. UMTS/3GPP Security 
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) is a third generation (3G) 
mobile telecommunication system whose security system is somewhat similar to, although 
more sophisticated than, that used in GSM. UMTS offers the following security services in 
addition to those provided by GSM [5]: 
i. Mutual authentication between the user and network. 
ii. Assurance that authentication information and keys are not being re-used. 
iii. Integrity protection of signaling messages against replay or modification. 
iv. Encryption is mandatory, and the encryption algorithm used is stronger. 
v. Termination of the encryption further into the core network to encompass 
microwave links. 
 
3. Using GSM Authentication For Electronic Transaction 
Within every SIM there exists a long-term secret key, Ki, which is unique and only 
known to the SIM and Authentication Center (AuC) of the home network operator and 
subscribe.  
 
To authenticate a SIM, the visited network needs a triplet, which consists of a random 
number (RAND), the expected response (XRES), and a secret cipher key (Kc). The (RAND, 
XPRES) pair enables the network to verify the authenticity of the SIM without having the key 
Ki while Kc is used for encryption. In order to compute a triplet, the AuC generates a RAND 
and passes it with Ki as parameters to algorithm A3 and A8, which are specific to a network 
operator. The outputs of A3 and A8 are XRES and Kc respectively.  
 
The AuC generates triplets as required, and passes them to whichever network needs 
them. When a SIM is requested to authenticate itself to a network a RAND from a triplet 
provided by the SIM’s home network is sent from the network to the SIM. Since the SIM is 
equipped with the function A3 and the secret key Ki, it can generate the Signed Response 
(SRES) using RAND and Ki as inputs. The SIM then sends the SRES to the network where the 
SRES is compared with the XRES. If they match, SIM verification is successful.  
 
 
4. Entities Involved 
In a typical debit/credit card payment system there are four parties involved, namely a 
client, a merchant, an acquiring bank and a card issuing bank. The precise interactions 
between these roles will vary depending on the transaction type. During a transaction, on-line 
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connectivity may be limited to certain subsets of roles. The underlying payment model is 
shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Debit/Credit Card Payment System 
 
a. Issuer 
A financial institution that issues a payment card to the cardholder. 
 
b. Cardholder 
 An authorized holder of a card supplied by the issuer. The card stores the 
cardholder's payment data and is capable of generating authentication data and verifying a 
cardholder's PIN. The cardholder is associated with a Primary Account Number (PAN), 
stored on the card that identifies the cardholder account and the issuer. During a transaction, 
the card has a connection only to the merchant, which passes authorization messages to the 
issuer via the acquirer. 
 
c. Merchant 
This is the business that accepts the card payment for purchased goods. It uses a 
terminal to interact with the card. The terminal also interacts with the issuer (via the acquirer) 
to receive authorization for transactions. 
 
 
d. Acquirer 
This is a financial institution that processes card payment authorizations and 
payments for the merchant. The acquirer and the issuer communicate via a secure financial 
network. 
 
Issuing Bank Acquiring Bank 
Client Merchant Payment 
Clearing  
Withdrawal Deposit 
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5. Security Requirements  
As shown in Figure 1.1, a typical card payment system involves four parties, namely 
a card issuer, an acquirer, a merchant and a client. The security requirements for each party 
vary and hence they will be examined individually. 
 
However, the security requirements for acquirers and issuers are discussed together 
since they are both financial institutions; they are both contractually obliged to abide by the 
rules of the relevant payment system.   
 
a. Issuer and Acquirer 
i. Non-Repudiation 
Issuers and acquirers need to ensure that neither clients nor merchants can 
deny their participation in a transaction (where the transaction may involve a refund 
from merchant to client). In order to achieve non-repudiation, identity authentication 
may also be needed. The main goal of non-repudiation service is to collect, maintain, 
make available and validate indisputable evidence. 
 
ii. Integrity 
It is also important to ensure that once details of a transaction have been 
confirmed, no one can maliciously modify them. Merchants must not be able to alter 
the amount that a client has agreed to pay. To be more specific, it should not be 
possible for a merchant to change the amount after it has been authorized by the card 
issuer. Similarly, a client must not be able to change the amount that has been 
authorized. 
 
iii. Authentication 
Client authentication is required for the issuers and acquirers so that they can 
prove that it is the client who authorized the payment and that he/she is a legitimate 
cardholder. Otherwise, a client can deny making a transaction and the issuer may end 
up being liable for refunding the amount to the client. On the other hand, if an 
electronic transaction is found to be fraudulent, merchants are liable for ‘card not 
present’ chargeback’s. Therefore, it is important for the acquirer to ensure merchant 
non-repudiation to prevent them challenging their liability. 
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iv. Replay protection 
A malicious merchant should not be able to use a once authorized transaction 
to obtain a repeat payment. Additionally, merchants should not be able to use an old 
transaction to request a new payment authorization no matter how many similar 
transactions the client has made with them. Issuers and acquirers need a mechanism 
to detect if a transaction has been replayed so that they do not authorize an 
illegitimate transaction. 
 
b. Merchants 
i. Non-Repudiation 
A merchant needs evidence that a customer has agreed to pay the amount 
associated with a transaction. A merchant also needs to verify that the client is the 
legitimate cardholder; otherwise, the merchant can be liable for chargeback’s. This 
occurs when a client tells his/her issuer that a particular transaction was not made. 
The card issuer then immediately submits a chargeback to the acquirer to recover the 
amount from the account of the merchant in question. Within a predefined period of 
time, the merchant can dispute the chargeback by providing evidence of, for example, 
purchase or delivery. Therefore, it is important for merchants to have non-repudiation 
evidence of the transaction, i.e. to have client non-repudiation. Furthermore, an issuer 
should not be able to deny having authorized a payment. 
 
ii. Integrity 
No one should be able to change the details of a transaction once they have 
been agreed upon otherwise the integrity of the transaction is damaged. A merchant 
will not wish to be credited with payment for less than the amount agreed. In 
addition, an acquirer or issuer should not be able to modify a transaction that has been 
authorized. 
 
iii. Authentication 
As stated before, merchants need client authentication to make sure that the 
client is the legitimate cardholder. Moreover, they need to be sure that they are 
communicating with the genuine acquirer. Otherwise, an adversary may masquerade 
as an acquirer and authorize an illegitimate transaction. 
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iv. Replay protection 
A malicious client should not be able to present an old proof of purchase to 
claim for repeat delivery of goods. Likewise, it should not be possible for an acquirer 
to claim that a merchant has obtained a payment using an old transaction.  
 
c. Client 
i. Non-repudiation 
Clients also require non-repudiation, for example a proof of payment so that 
no one involved in the transaction can repudiate that a payment has occurred. 
 
ii. Integrity 
As for the other parties, transaction integrity is important to the client. No one 
should be able to maliciously modify the transaction details once they have been 
confirmed. Clients will not want an adversary to change a delivery address, the price, 
or the description of the merchandise after they have agreed a payment. 
 
iii. Confidentiality and privacy 
Transaction confidentiality, especially card information, may be the security 
service of most concern to users. It is important that cardholder account details are 
kept secret from any party except the issuer and its bearer, since they are the main 
basis on which Internet payments are made. Moreover, some users may require 
confidentiality protection for the nature of their transactions. 
 
iv. Authentication 
A client needs to be sure that he/she is dealing with a trustworthy merchant. 
When shopping on the Internet, it is relatively easy to be attracted into visiting a site 
that appears to sell something but is actually simply collecting card details. Even 
though a client may have made a purchase from a site before, it is not always obvious 
whether the page that is being fetched is authentic. 
 
v. Replay protection 
Clients need a mechanism to ensure that a malicious merchant or an 
adversary will not be able to reuse previously authorized payments to make a repeat 
charge. 
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Merchant 
Server 
6. System Architecture  
Three main system components are involved in our payment protocol. These are a 
User System, a merchant server, and an AuC. The system architecture is:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: System architecture - GSM-based cardholder authentication. 
 
a. User System 
The user system consist of a GSM Mobile Station (MS), i.e. a GSM Mobile 
Equipment (ME) and a GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), and a PC. The MS is 
responsible for outputting the SRES. Therefore, although an ME is needed to interact with the 
SIM, the protocol can work without an ME if there is an alternative means for the SIM to 
communicate with the user’s PC. The means of communication used between the MS and the 
user PC is not mentioned here. However, infrared, cable, or Bluetooth1 could be employed for 
the purpose. In a recent version of the SIM Toolkit (U-SIM Application Toolkit), there is a 
command called ‘AT Command’ which enables a U-SIM to tell an ME to open an infrared or 
Bluetooth channel. The U-SIM Application Toolkit (USAT), therefore could be used to 
implement the proposed protocol.  
 
b. Merchant Server And Authentication Center  
The merchant server is the component that interacts with the User System to support 
electronic transactions. The communication link between the Merchant Server and Cardholder 
system is the Internet. The merchant server also interacts with the AuC in order to retrieve 
values required in the user authentication process. The AuC is required to supply the 
merchant server with values necessary for the GSM identity authentication process. It takes 
inputs from the merchant server and produces the values used for identity authentication. The 
choice of the communication link between the two is again not an issue here. However, it can 
be SSL/TLS protected Internet session or a special purpose link provided by the mobile 
network operator.  
                                                 
1 http://www.bluetooth.com  
TLS Protected 
TLS Protected  
Authentication Center  
Internet link 
User System 
 
 
Mobile  
Station  
PC 
SIM Cable, Infrared 
Or Bluetooth
Special purpose   
Internet        
     or         
      link 
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Merchant 
Server 
 
We suppose that the integrity and confidentiality of the merchant server /AuC link is 
protected in some way, e.g. via encryption and MACs or signature; however, the means by 
which this is achieved is outside of the scope of this paper.  
 
7. How The Transaction Is Processed 
The protocol assumes that the consumer and the merchant wish to perform a specified 
transaction. Hence, the protocol starts with a consumer has decided to make a payment.  
 
The consumer first fills in a typical Internet purchase form using the PC. In this 
protocol however, the form is required to contain a field for a mobile phone number. Upon 
receipt of the form, the merchant server extracts the mobile number form the form and the 
identity authentication process begin.  The procedure is illustrated below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: GSM Identity Authentication Process  
 
 
The merchant server first sends the consumer’s mobile number to the AuC in order to 
receive three values: A random number (RAND), an expected response (XRES), and the 
subscriber name (SRES). This corresponds to the message 1 in figure 1.3.  
 
Upon receipt of the merchant server request, the AuC generates the (RAND, XRES) 
pair using the key Ki of the requested mobile number with algorithm A3. It then sends the 
(RAND, XRES) pair, along with the name of the subscriber, to the merchant server, as shown 
in the message 2 in figure 1.3. Upon receipt of the message 2, the merchant server first 
compares the name of the cardholder with the subscriber names received from the AuC. If 
they match, the RAND will be sent to the PC as in message 3 of figure 1.3. Otherwise, the 
identity authentication process fails and the protocol ends.   
     User System 
 
 
Mobile  
Station  
PC SIM 
Authentication Center 
 2.  RAND. XRES. Name  
1. Mobile Number  
3. RAND 
4. SRES 
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After receiving the RAND, the user PC forwards it to the Merchant (ME). The ME 
then sends the RAND values to the SIM just as it would if the RAND was sent via the radio 
interface by a GSM base station. The SIM now generates SRES using the received RAND 
and its stored Ki as inputs to algorithm A3. The SIM then passes the generated SRES back to 
the ME, again just as it would normally (i.e. no special functionality is required to have the 
SIM). The ME then sends the SRES to the PC, which forwards the value to the merchant 
server (Message 4). At the merchant server, the SRES is compared with the XRES. If they 
match, the consumer is deemed to have been authenticated. The Internet transaction 
processing may now continue.  
 
8. Threat Analysis 
In this section, we consider threats to the proposed protocol. The threats can be 
divided into three categories: threats to the User System, threats to the two communications 
links (user system/merchant server and merchant server/AuC), and threats in the merchant 
server and the AuC. 
 
a. Threats in the User System 
As stated previously, the User System consists of a user PC and a MS. Since this 
protocol does not require the user PC to contain sensitive information, the threats arising from 
the PC are minimal. Although information that passes via the PC can be cached, this 
information is not confidential. A debit/credit card number can be cached and compromised 
but the protocol still requires a corresponding SIM to make an electronic transaction. In any 
event, such a threat would exist in any PC-based e-commerce protocol.  
 
Threats to the MS are divided into two scenarios, depending on the amount of 
information an attacker has. Clearly, if he/she has neither the SIM nor the card details, a 
transaction cannot be made and hence there is no threat. It should also be clear that if the 
attacker has both a complete set of card details and a stolen SIM for the cardholder, then the 
system cannot prevent an attack unless, of course, the SIM has been reported stolen and 
blacklisted by the network, or the SIM has been PIN protected by its owner. We therefore 
consider the two main `intermediate' scenarios.  
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i. Scenario 1 : Attacker has a stolen SIM without the corresponding card details.  
In this scenario, if an attacker has stolen a SIM and the subscriber name of 
the stolen SIM is unknown, although a valid SRES can be generated, he/she will not 
be able to create a matched cardholder name necessary to pass the authentication 
process. 
 
By contrast, if the attacker knows the subscriber name, it is possible to 
complete the protocol successfully using a fabricated set of cardholder details as long 
as the fabricated details include a cardholder name corresponding to the subscriber 
name. However, the fraud will become clear soon after the merchant tries to charge 
the card. In the most typical case for an e-commerce transaction, the merchant will try 
to charge the specified payment card before the goods are dispatched. In such a case, 
the threat is therefore small. Nevertheless, the threat can be more serious if the goods 
are, for example, information or music, which will be delivered instantly via the 
Internet. However, even in this case, the threat can be avoided if, as is often the case, 
the merchant server seeks payment authorization before authorizing delivery of the 
goods. If the card details are fabricated then the card issuer will, of course, reject the 
payment. 
 
A possible way to prevent such attacks is for the SIM to be PIN-protected. It is also 
important that the PIN is never entered on an untrusted device.  
 
ii. Scenario 2 : Attacker has stolen card details without the corresponding SIM.  
If an attacker has only card details, without the SIM, it will not be possible to 
generate a valid SRES. This threat is therefore addressed by the scheme described 
above. Thus, to be successful, an attack on the user system needs both the victim's 
SIM and the corresponding debit/credit card details to complete a fraudulent 
transaction. 
 
b. Threats to the communications links 
If any of the information transferred across either of the links is modified, then the 
protocol will fail. Hence, a theoretical denial of service attack exists, although there are many 
simpler ways to prevent the completion of a transaction. We now consider other threats 
arising to the two links. 
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c. Threats on the PC/merchant server link  
The confidentiality and integrity issues apply to the payment information transferred 
across this link. However, we assume that the Internet link between the PC and merchant 
server is protected using SSL/TLS throughout the transaction procedure. 
 
Note that a possible alternative to the protocol described here would be to use GSM 
authentication to enhance the security of the SSL/TLS initialization process. However, if such 
an approach is followed, it is not clear how to achieve the desired link between the GSM 
subscriber name and the cardholder name.  
 
d. Threats on the merchant server/AuC link   
Threats on this link can be further divided into two types, namely integrity threats and 
confidentiality threats. 
 
i. Integrity threats 
There are a number of ways in which an attacker could manipulate this link in 
order to persuade the merchant server to accept an impostor. Perhaps the simplest 
method would involve the attacker using an arbitrary (valid) SIM and ME in 
combination with stolen card details (which, of course, will not match the GSM 
subscription name). In message 2 the AuC will provide a valid RAND and XRES for 
the attacker's SIM, and will return the name associated with the attacker's GSM 
subscription. An active attacker could change this name to the name associated with 
the stolen card details, and the merchant server will accept message 2. The 
remainder of the protocol will complete correctly, and the account for which the 
details were stolen will be charged for the transaction.  
 
An alternative attack, again using stolen card details, does not require the 
attacker to have a valid SIM at all. The attacker supplies an arbitrary (but valid) 
GSM number with the stolen card details. In message 2, the AuC will send a 
(RAND, XRES) pair for the arbitrarily chosen GSM subscription, along with the 
subscriber name. The active attacker can then replace the contents of message 2 
with the name for the stolen card details, along with an arbitrary (RAND, XRES) 
pair. The merchant server will accept message 2 because the names match, and will 
send the manipulated RAND to the attacker in message 3. The attacker simply 
returns the manipulated XRES value in message 4, and again the attack will 
succeed. The existence of these attacks means that it is vital that the integrity of the 
link between AuC and merchant server is protected.  
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ii. Confidentiality threats 
There are also a number of serious confidentiality threats. First note that a 
passive eavesdropper can perform an attack similar to the second integrity attack 
described above. Suppose an attacker has a set of stolen card details and also knows 
the GSM number for the owner of the stolen card details. The attacker initiates the 
protocol using the stolen card details and the known GSM number. Message 2 will 
be accepted by the Merchant server because the GSM number belongs to the valid 
cardholder. However, if the attacker can intercept message 2, then the XRES value 
can be obtained. The attacker then simply inserts this value into message 4 and the 
protocol will complete successfully.  
 
Also note that, in the absence of integrity and confidentiality, the merchant 
server/AuC protocol could also be used to find the subscriber name corresponding 
to any GSM number. This would be a significant breach of GSM subscriber 
confidentiality. 
 
These attacks mean that it is important to provide both confidentiality and 
integrity for this link, and this is why we assume throughout this section that this 
link is both confidentiality and integrity protected.  
 
e. Threats in the merchant server and the AuC 
Since the merchant server is responsible for the identity authentication process, in 
particular the comparison of names and XRES with SRES, it is important to protect the server 
against any attack, which might cause the protocol to be bypassed. 
 
Over and above the integrity of the user authentication process, the merchant server 
will have access to large volumes of potentially sensitive subscriber information. As part of 
the user authentication process, the merchant server retrieves from the AuC the account 
holder name for any GSM telephone number. Not only this a sensitive privacy issue, but also 
requiring the AuC to supply such information may potentially be in breach of its licence 
and/or data privacy legislation. It is therefore vital that the merchant server be protected and 
trusted so that this information cannot be abused. 
 
The AuC is then required to compare the name supplied in message 1 with the name 
it has associated with the GSM number. If they do not match, the protocol should not proceed. 
If they do match, in message 2 the AuC simply provides a (RAND, XRES) pair.  
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Figure 1.4: Revised Protocol  
 
 
Another way to reduce this threat is for the merchant server to create and send a 
RAND to the User System and thence the SIM. Upon the receipt of the RAND, the SIM 
generates the SRES and sends it to the merchant server via the user PC. The merchant server 
subsequently sends the cardholder's name, his/her mobile number, the RAND, and the SRES to 
the AuC to verify. The protocol is shown in Figure 1.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Another revised protocol. 
 
These modified protocols have the advantage that the AuC retains control of sensitive 
subscriber information. However, it has the disadvantage of requiring additional processing 
by the AuC. If the integrity of the AuC could be compromised, then there are possible attacks 
to the security of the user authentication process. However, in such an event there are also 
many other serious attacks to the security of the GSM network itself, and so we assume that 
the AuC is well protected. 
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9. Conclusion  
 We have proposed a way in which GSM subscriber identity authentication can be 
used to enhance e-commerce security. The protocol provides user authentication and hence 
significantly reduces threats arising from misuse of misappropriated card details. It therefore 
also indirectly reduces the risk of storing card details in unencrypted from a merchant server. 
The protocol works with ‘standard’ GSM SIM and requires only appropriate equipped Mobile 
Equipment and a user PC. It therefore, imposes minimal overheads on the user, thus 
increasing the like hood of successful use. The gains for the merchant in terms of reduced 
chargeback also appear significant, and the possibility of an increased revenue stream may 
also make the system attractive to the GSM operators. 
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